BAKU/YEREVAN

Armenia and Azerbaijan remain locked in a dispute about demarcating their shared, but closed border. The issue is of utmost importance for reopening vital trade routes, not only between the two estranged countries, but between Turkey, Europe, and far eastern Asia.

Russia’s reputation is at stake in de-escalating the disagreements. It was Moscow that negotiated the late 2020 peace agreement ending six weeks of renewed fighting and the Kremlin dispatched 2,000 peacekeepers to the areas of conflict between the two neighbours.

Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia are part of a commission dedicated to re-opening trade routes, which was a condition of the peace deal, including the long-shuttered rail and road link between Azerbaijan proper and its exclave of Nakhchivan – one which crosses Armenian territory.

But an incident earlier this month raised alarm bells.

Yerevan claims Azerbaijani forces penetrated about three km deep into its territory and occupied an area near a strategic lake and reservoir. Yerevan says part of the 200-plus strong Azerbaijani unit later left, and it has not said how many remained.

The area also happens to be precisely in the region where the “Zangilan corridor” – linking Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan – is located.

Armenian Acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan seemed recently to back off on opening the 40-km corridor to Azerbaijani or international traffic. During a trip to the area, he prevaricated on opening the route, which passes through a remote, sparsely populated chunk of Armenia.

Some analysts say the corridor’s international legal status would be in question.

But many analysts do not see the issue as more than a part of a relatively normal, thorny process after nearly 30 years of war. The two sides cite differing Soviet-era maps which may not fully reflect the demographics along the line.

MOSCOW’S REPUTATION ON THE LINE

Any uptick in serious tensions would inevitably call into question Russia’s central role as the provider of peacekeepers and the guarantor of the peace deal and would be a major embarrassment for Moscow.

Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin has taken an unusual role in the issue and has been in contact with both Baku and Yerevan over the last week or so in an effort to head off a potential escalation.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also visited Armenia and Azerbaijan over the last 10 days in an attempt to calm passions.

“Russia has offered first of all to provide assistance with the delimitation and demarcation of the border,” Lavrov told reporters last week.

He said Moscow had proposed setting up a joint Armenian-Azerbaijani commission, with Russia possibly participating as a consultant or mediator.

Few believe the spat could reignite major hostilities, though ignoring the issue could also breed more distrust or act as a spark to trouble.

AZERBAIJANI LEADER DE-EMPHASISES TENSIONS

President Ilham Aliyev, speaking on Friday at an international conference in Baku, also did not seem to be particularly alarmed over the disagreement. No injuries, deaths or armed incidents have been reported.

“Azerbaijan is open for cooperation, open for planning a common future, because we are neighbours, whether we like it or not. We must live side by side, and we must learn to live side by side again,” Aliyev said.

He acknowledged that it is not easy.

“Emotions are present, especially when Azerbaijanis visit the liberated territories and see total destruction. You can imagine what emotions they feel. But the role of politicians is to protect the existing agenda and explain that only through contacts, through interaction, one can ensure development, peace and security in the region,” Aliyev added.

“The war is over and now is a time for the new vision for South Caucasus with the focus on development and cooperation…”

Azerbaijan cites Soviet-era historical maps to make its claim that it did not start an incursion, but that its border troops were merely demarcating territory long established by the official frontiers between former Soviet republics.

The successor states of the former Soviet Union agreed upon its dissolution to respect those borders, established by military cartographers.

But one problem is that the borders meant close to nothing in practice. As long as the USSR existed, there were no border posts, and in the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia, some communities populated by one ethnic group or another lived on opposite sides of the “official” frontiers. There were also many “enclave villages” on either side which were officially administrated by either Baku or Yerevan on either side.

Commentators have suggested that the real reason for the border fracas, and subsequent claim by Yerevan that Baku had illegally entered its territory, was the Azerbaijani government’s desire to put pressure on Armenia to agree to open the corridor, as specified in the November 2020 Russian-brokered peace agreement.

Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan has been cut off from road and rail traffic since open hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan began in 1991-1992.

But acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, though having signed the agreement which would in fact open the corridor, has recently baulked at such a prospect, apparently fearing that it could be seen as a territorial concession to Baku, evidently because some sort of international monitoring would have to accompany at least the early stages of any opening.

This also may be due to the upcoming snap elections in Armenia.

Although Pashinyan has a huge lead, according to polls, in advance of next month’s election, he is likely reluctant to risk any backlash or being seen as too soft until the vote is over and he establishes a clear mandate to eventually normalise relations with Baku, and eventually, Turkey.

A disparate collection of ultra-nationalist opponents together is still registering less than five percent of poll support.

Among the more wild-eyed claims, some of these types have even accused Pashinyan of being secretly “pro-Turk”.

Pashinyan is not from the old-school political class which included figures from the Azerbaijani district of Nagorno-Karabakh, still populated mainly by ethnic Armenians.

The conflict over the region was the original flashpoint for the war. Powerful Armenian diaspora types provided money and diplomatic prowess abroad. But Pashinyan, observers say, is less likely to heed their line, though with elections looming, the author, journalist, and former political activist is likely to play things carefully until establishing a solid mandate.

Pashinyan shocked conventional wisdom this month by saying during a parliamentary session that although Turkey was still an adversary, the two countries were also neighbours, who essentially would have to co-exist sooner or later.

For some in Armenia, this was an unthinkable statement, though many of them may quietly agree.

Given that Pashinyan remains miles ahead in polls, despite his detractors accusing him of “losing the war” to Azerbaijan, which is supported by Turkey, this is indeed seems to the case. Armenia was forced to give up seven Azerbaijani districts it had held since 1993-1994 and parts of the former autonomous USSR district of Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly the city of Shusha, which always had an ethnic Azeri majority.

But though Armenia occupied these districts and systematically dismantled them, it never developed them. In the process, 600,000 ethnic Azeris were ethnically cleansed. Yet only a few thousand at most Armenian “settlers” moved to the districts, a large number of them were members of the families of Armenian troops sent to serve in the areas, or ran tiny businesses that served them, such as the odd small grocery shop.